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Recent Developments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE UNIFORM RELOCA-
TION ACT: FEDERAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE AND THE DETERMINATION
OF "DISPLACED PERSON"
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA or Act)1 marked Congress' attempt to
"establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons
displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted programs." 2  In fol-
lowing this congressional mandate, the courts have construed the definitional
provision of the URA, section 4601(6), 3 somewhat inconsistently, especially
in cases involving foreclosure on federally insured mortgages. 4
This note will focus on the eligibility requirements for URA benefits in
connection with federally insured mortgages. Specifically, it will address the
question of whether persons relocated due to the mortgage foreclosure pro-
cess qualify as "displaced persons" within the meaning of section 4601(6).
The various constructions of section 4601(6) by the circuits will be examined
and, after a comparison of these conflicting views, a conclusion as to whether
or not foreclosure on a federally insured mortgage should bring a relocated
individual within the URA's definition of "displaced person" will be offered.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1970). For a general discussion of the URA, see Eichenberg,
From Capitol Hill: A Uniform Relocation Act: The Price of Uniformity, 3 UnB. LAW. 480 (1971);
Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745 (1971); Special Re-
search Study -Relocation -The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act of 1970-An Empirical Study, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1329 (1975) [herinafter cited as
Special Research Study]; Comment, The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight
of the Displaced, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 552 (1976); Note, In the Path of Progress: Federal
Highway Relocation Assurances, 82 YALE L.J. 373 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). The URA is divided into three subehapters: Subchapter I
includes the General Provisions, id. §§ 4601-4603; Subchapter II deals with Uniform Relocation
Assistance, id. 9 4621-4638; and Subchapter III contains the Uniform Real Property Acquisi-
tion Policy, id. 99 4651-4655. This note will concentrate on the Uniform Relocation Assistance
provisions. Id. §§ 4621-4638.
Section 4621, the declaration of policy, provides:
The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equi-
table treatment of persons displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted programs
in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs
designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.
Id. § 4621. However, assistance conferred under the URA is often not quite as broad as this
declaration of policy would suggest. See Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). For discussion of Moorer, see note 71 infra.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). This provision defines the term "displaced person" for the
purposes of the URA. Id. The section is actually an entitlement provision since the operational
sections of the URA confer benefits on those individuals attaining the status of a "displaced
person" within the meaning of the Act. See id. §9 4622-4625. For the text of § 4601(6), see note
14 infra.
4. Compare Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087
(1978) and Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) with Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978). For a discussion of federally insured
mortgages, see note 22 infra.
(91)
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II. ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE UNIFORM RELOCATION ACT
Effective as of January 2, 1971, 5 the URA consolidated scattered federal
relocation statutes.6 The Act places greater emphasis on the federal gov-
ernment's assumption of relocation costs than previous enactments. 7 Ben-
efits conferred include payments for actual reasonable moving expenses,"
compensation for direct losses of personal property as a result of relocating
or discontinuing a business, 9 and advisory assistance.' 0 In addition,
homeowners " and tenants 12 are provided with special assistance in locating
suitable replacement housing.' 3 To qualify for these benefits, one must
meet the statutory definition of "displaced person" contained in section
4601(6) of the URA.' 4
5. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-646, § 221, 84 Stat. 1894 (1971).
6. Uncodified section 220 of the URA fully or partially repealed eleven laws. Id. § 220.
Prior to the enactment of the URA, the most utilized mechanisms for providing federal reloca-
tion assistance included § 114 of the Housing Act of 1964, ch. 338, § 114, 78 Stat. 788 (repealed
1971), and § 30 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 30, 82 Stat. 830 (repealed 1971). See
Special Research Study, supra note 1, at 1334-41.
7. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 4623(a)(1), 4624(1) (1976) with Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968,
§ 30, 82 Stat. 830 (repealed 1971). The URA increased the amount of available relocation assis-
tance payments. Under the URA, displaced homeowners may receive up to $15,000 in replace-
ment housing payments in addition to payments for moving expenses and losses of personal
property. 42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1) (1976). Displaced tenants may qualify for a maximum of $4,000
in replacement housing payments. Id. § 4624(1) (1976). See notes 11-13 and accompanying text
infra. For a critique of the assistance conferred under the URA, see Special Research Study,
supra note 1, at 1329, 1341-50.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1) (1976). The head of the federal agency is obligated to make
payments and provide relocation advisory services under the URA. Id. §§ 4622-4626. Payments
are made for both personal and commercial relocations. Id. § 4622.
9. Id. § 4622(a)(2). Actual reasonable expenses incurred while a displaced person is
searching for a replacement business or farm are also reimbursed. Id. § 4622(a)(3).
10. Section 4625 establishes a relocation assistance advisory service program. Id. § 4625. Its
function is to ensure that the relocation needs of displaced persons are satisfied. Id.
11. Id. § 4023. Displaced homeowners are eligible for an additional $15,000 in order to
secure suitable replacement housing. Id. § 4623(a)(1). See note 7 supra. Accommodations for
mortgage insurance may also be provided. 42 U.S.C. § 4623(b) (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4624 (1976). This section allows additional payments of displaced tenants of
up to $4,000. Id. § 4624(1). See note 7 supra. This money is to be used for either rental
payments or a down payment on a house. 42 U.S.C. § 4624 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4623(a)(1), 4624(1) (1976). Of particular importance to the displaced
homeowner or tenant is § 4630, which extended URA responsibilities to state agencies receiving
federal financial assistance. Id. § 4630. This section requires that a federal agency may not
approve federal funding for a state program until it receives assurances from the state agency
that decent, safe, and sanitary replacement housing will be available to the displaced persons
within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement. Id. § 4630(3). The agency must also
ensure that relocation advisory services are supplied. Id. § 4630(2). See note 10 supra.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). Section 4601(6) provides in pertinent part:
The term "displaced person" means any person who, on or after January 2, 1971,
moves from real property, or moves his personal property from real property, as a result
of the acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the written
order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken
by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance. ...
Id. See note 3 supra.
[VOL. 24: p. 91
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One may achieve the status of a "displaced person" within the meaning
of section 4601(6) in either of two ways: 1) if a person moves from real
property as a result of the acquisition of such property for a program or
project undertaken by a federal agency or with federal financial assistance
(the acquisition clause);15 or 2) if a person moves from real property as a
result of a written order from the acquiring agency to vacate the property for
a program or project undertaken by a federal agency or with federal financial
assistance (the written notice clause). 16
Courts have examined other definitional provisions of the URA in order
to determine whether a claimant has satisfied either of these criteria in a
particular factual situation. 1 7 While the terms "federal agency" and "federal
financial assistance" have specific statutory definitions,' 8 the words "acquisi-
tions," "project," "program" and "acquiring agency" do not. In the typical
situations to which the URA applies, 19 this absence of statutory definitions
for certain terms creates no obstacles to claimants of URA benefits. For
example, the URA ordinarily applies to a situation where an agency with the
power of eminent domain, such as the Department of Transportation, con-
demns dwellings in order to demolish them and to construct an interstate
highway on that site. 20  In such a case, former residents of the condemned
buildings would be eligible for URA benefits. 2 '
In other factual settings, however, eligibility for benefits is not so clear.
One such situation exists where a landlord-mortgagor with a federally in-
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976).
16. Id.
17. For cases where the phrase "Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance" of §
4601(6) was determinative of the litigants' claims for URA assistance, see Moorer v. HUD, 561
F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) (persons relocated due to private
company's acquisition of property for rehabilitation with the aid of federal mortgage insurance
are not "displaced persons"); Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975) (tenant evicted by private institution receiving federal grants
is not a "displaced person"). See also Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment
Agency, 389 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Feliciano v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601(1), 4601(4) (1976). The term "Federal agency" includes "any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch of the Government" and "any wholly
owned Government corporation." Id. § 4601(1). "Federal financial assistance" means "a grant,
loan, or contribution provided by the United States, except any Federal guarantee or insurance
and any annual payment or capital loan to the District of Columbia." Id. § 4601(4).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5850, 5850-51. The House Report identified sample public projects which
may require the acquisition and clearance of sites which previously served residential and com-
mercial uses. Id. Included in these projects were highway construction, urban renewal, and
hospital construction. Id. The House Report explained the meaning of the term "displaced
person" by providing the examples of persons required to relocate due to: 1) acquisition of
rights-of-way for federal-aid highways; and 2) construction sites for post offices. Id. at 4-5, re-
printed in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5853-54.
20. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies-1970: Hearings on H.R.
14898, S.1, and related bills before the Comm. on Public Works House of Representatives, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 598 (1969-1970) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4. P96/11: 91-30) (statement of Francis
C. Turner, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration, Department of Transportation).
21. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
1978-1979]
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sured mortgage 22 defaults, and the federal agency receives title to the prop-
erty from the mortgagee as a prerequisite to the mortgagee's recovery on the
federal mortgage insurance. 23  Confronted with claims for URA assistance
from tenants required to relocate as a result of this foreclosure process, the
courts have found it necessary to examine the undefined words of section
4601(6) in reaching their conclusions on eligibility. 24  Differing statutory
constructions of these undefined terms have evolved within the circuits. The
Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have adopted an in pari materia ap-
proach,2 5 whereas a common meaning construction has been accepted by the
D.C. Circuit. 26  Eligibility for URA benefits depends upon the method of
statutory construction adopted by the court in interpreting section 4601(6).27
III. ELIGIBILITY IN THE FEDERAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE CONTEXT
A. The In Pari Materia Approach of the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
In Caramico v. HUD,2 8 the Second Circuit first interpreted the
applicability of section 4601(6) to foreclosures on federally insured
mortgages. 29  In Caramico, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)30
22. As a measure in spreading the mortgage risk and as an inducement for private industry
to provide housing, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pursuant to
the National Housing Act, insures mortgages for single family and multiple family dwellings. 12
U.S.C. §§ 1701 to 1715z-11 (1976). See H. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES 74-90 (1972); G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 487-513 (1976). For
example, § 1709 provides for the Secretary of HUD to insure any mortgage meeting certain
conditions in order to assist private industry in providing housing for displaced families of low
and moderate income. 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976). See H. AARON, supra, at 77-78; G. NELSON,
supra, at 487-88. In order to recover on a claim on the mortgage, the lender must either assign
the mortgage to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or acquire title to the property and
transfer that title to the FHA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1710, 1713(g), 1713(k) (1976); G. NELSON, supra, at
511. See generally 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.355-417 (1977). The effect of the mortgage insurance is
that the lender will regard the insurance contract as shifting the risk of default on the loan to
the insurer and, consequently, the mortgagee will be willing to charge the same interest rate to
the "risky" borrower as it would to the most creditworthy borrower. H. AARON, supra, at 81-89;
G. NELSON, supra, at 488.
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1710 (1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.358-361 (1977); note 22 supra. See also
note 33 infra.
24. See, e.g., Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087
(1978); Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978);
Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974); Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Mo.
1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977).
25. See, e.g., Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087
(1978); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974); Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Mo. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977). See notes 28-99 and accompanying text infra.
26. See Cole v. Harris, 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978).
For discussion of Cole, see notes 100-36 and accompanying text infra.
27. For example, under the approach of Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974), a
"project" for the purposes of § 4601(6) necessarily involves construction. See notes 41-48 and
accompanying text infra. Application of the Caramico analysis to the facts of Cole v. Harris, 571
F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978), would probably result in a denial of
URA benefits to Cole plaintiffs. See notes 100-36 and accompanying text infra.
28. 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 694-96.
30. The FHA is a subagency of HUD. Id. at 696 n.2.
[VOL. 24: p. 91
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had insured mortgages on multiple family dwellings 31 and, following a de-
fault by the landlords, the mortgagees foreclosed. 32  Pursuant to an FHA
regulation requiring that the property be delivered unoccupied to the FHA
before a mortgagee could recover on the mortgage insurance, 3 3 the
mortgagees sought to evict the tenants from the dwellings. 34  In response,
the tenants filed suit to enjoin the eviction and to secure assistance under
the URA. 35 The district court held that URA assistance was not available to
the tenants. 36
In affirming, 37 the Second Circuit emphasized that although there may
have been an "acquisition" in the present case, 38 the tenants had failed to
demonstrate that the acquisition was "for a program or project undertaken
by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance." 39  According to
the court, the tenants were not displaced persons within the meaning of the
acquisition clause of section 4601(6).4o Distinguishing between acquisitions
resulting from mortgage insurance transactions and those intended to be
covered by the URA, 4' 1 the Caramico court emphasized that the former are
"random and involuntary." 42 In contrast, the court noted that normal urban
renewal projects involve a deliberate governmental decision to dislocate cer-
tain individuals for the benefit of the entire area. 43  Relying on the URA's
31. Id. at 696. According to the trial court, the FHA insured mortgage was pursuant to the
amended § 1709 of the National Housing Act. Caramico v. Romney, 390 F. Supp. 210, 212
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974), citing 12
U.S.C. § 1709 (1976).
32. 509 F.2d at 696.
33. 24 C.F.R. § 203.381 (1977). This regulation required the mortgagee to certify that the
property is vacant unless the Secretary of HUD provides otherwise. Id. In Caramico, the ten-
ants claimed that they possessed a due process right to participate in the decision of the FHA
not to waive the general regulation that the buildings be delivered unoccupied. 509 F.2d at
699-702. The court agreed, and ordered the Secretary of HUD to provide the minimum due
process safeguards of sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 701-02. Compare
24 C.F.R. § 203.381 (1975) with 24 C.F.R. § 203.381 (1977) (due process guidelines for tenant
incorporated into regulations).
34. 509 F.2d at 696.
35. Id. at 697. The tenants claimed that the evictions were improper because of the failure
to provide URA benefits for those evicted. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 4622, 4624, 4625 (1976); notes
8-10 & 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
36. 390"F. Supp. at 214-15.
37. 509 F.2d at 702.
38. Id. at 697. Plaintiffs asserted that HUD's policy of requiring a vacant dwelling before it
will satisfy the FHA insurance claim resulted in an eviction due to the "acquisition" of real
property within the meaning of the URA. Id.
39. Id. The court reasoned that an eviction due to an "acquisition," absent further showing,
did not satisfy the qualification requirements for URA benefits. Id.
40. Id. For a summary of the acquisition clause, see text accompanying note 15 supra.
41. 509 F.2d at 697-98. The plaintiffs had argued that the federal mortgage insurance pro-
gram's vacant delivery requirement is similar to a federal urban renewal scheme in that the
vacant conveyance enables HUD to "deal with the property by rehabilitation or other disposi-
tion." Id. at 697.
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legislative history 44 and other statutory provisions of the Act, 45 the Second
Circuit decided that "program" or "project" within the meaning of section
4601(6) contemplates construction. 46  Default acquisitions, the court de-
clared, are inconistent with this construction concept because they involve
no conscious governmental decision 47 and effectively "represent a failure of
the FHA program rather than its desired result." 48
Unlike Caramico, which involved the acquisition clause of section
4601(6), 49 Alexander v. HUD 50 presented the Seventh Circuit with an op-
portunity to construe the written notice clause contained in the displaced
person definition of the URA. 51 In Alexander, the tenants of an apartment
project sought relief under the URA after the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) had given them written notice to quit.52 HUD's
initial involvement with the Alexander apartment complex arose when HUD
issued mortgage insurance pursuant to section 1715(d)(3) of the National
Housing Act.53  Following the mortgagor's default, HUD was assigned the
note and mortgage on the property, 54 and subsequently foreclosed due to
the continuing default of the mortgagor. 55  HUD thereafter acquired title to
the apartment complex at a marshal's sale. 56  After attempts to continue
operation of the deteriorating complex proved futile, 5 7 HUD decided to
44. Id. The court quoted a discussion of the policies underlying the URA by the Committee
on Public Works of the House of Representatives. Id., quoting H.R. REP. No. 1656, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5850, 5850-51. The
Caramico court focused on the illustrations of major public projects listed in the report, such as
the construction of a highway, an urban renewal project, and the construction of a hospital, in
disposing of the plaintiffs' claims. 509 F.2d at 698. See note 19 supra.
45. 509 F.2d at 698. The court noted that various sections of the URA indicate "that con-
struction programs are the type Congress had in mind in providing displaced person assistance."
Id. The court cited § 4626, referring to "actual construction" of a federal project, and § 4625(a),
providing for aid where an acquisition causes economic injury to neighboring property, in sup-
port of its position. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4626, 4625(a) (1976). The court further observed
that § 4651 describes acquisition methods that are inconsistent with the FHA's takeover of
defaulted property. 509 F.2d at 698, citing 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1976). The district court had also
indicated that § 4624 (assistance to tenants) speaks in terms of occupancy of the acquired prop-
erty "for not less than 90 days prior to the initiation of negotiations for acquisitions of such
dwellings." 390 F. Supp. at 214, citing 42 U.S.C. § 4624 (1976). The district court intimated
that this phrase refers to "the normal preliminary to condemnation proceedings." 390 F. Supp.
at 214. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4651(a) (1976).
46. 509 F.2d at 698.
47. Id. at 698-99.
48. Id. at 699.
49. Id. at 697. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
50. 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978).
51. 555 F.2d at 168-69, construing 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). For a summary of the writ-
ten notice clause, see text accompanying note 16 supra.
52. 555 F.2d at 167-68.
53. Id. at 167. See 42 U.S.C. § 1715 l(d)(3) (1976). For general discussion of federal
mortgage insurance, see note 22 supra.
54. 555 F.2d at 167.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 167-68. HUD had employed the Federal Property Management Corporation to
manage and to repair the buildings. Id. Affidavits attesting to the condition of the complex
[VOL. 24: p. 91
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terminate the project 58 and distributed written notices to quit to the tenants
of the complex. 59
The Seventh Circuit noted that although Alexander and Caramico were
factually distinguishable, 60 the issue presented in the two cases was essen-
tially "whether the activity of the governmental agency was 'for a program or
project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assis-
tance."' 61  Relying on the URA's declaration of policy, 62 the Alexander
court determined that the words "program" and "project" of section 4601(6)
were intended to include "those activities designed for the benefit of the
public as a whole." 63  According to the court, a decision to terminate a
project does not constitute a project within the meaning of the URA absent
"some indication that the decision to terminate and the order to vacate con-
stitute a prelude to some governmental undertaking amounting to a program
designed for the benefit of the public as a whole." 64  The court concluded
that the order by HUD to vacate the apartment buildings because "that
project had become an irretrievable failure cannot be considered" a project
for the purposes of the URA. 65  The Seventh Circuit consequently denied
relief to the tenants since they were not "displaced persons" within the
meaning of section 4601(6).66
In construing section 4601(6) in connection with federal mortgage insur-
ance, the Second 67 and Seventh Circuits 6 8 centered their analyses on the
word "project." 69  In contrast, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit focused on the "as a
provided evidence of roach and vermin infestation, inoperable elevators, poor security, in-
adequate or nonexistent hot water and heat, and other deplorable conditions. Id. The tenants
had alleged that HUD breached an implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 168. The court held,
however, that there was no implied warranty of habitability in a lease of a public housing unit
owned by HUD. Id. at 171.
58. Id. at 168.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 169. In Caramico, the private mortgagee sought to evict the plaintiff-tenants. 509
F.2d at 696. In Alexander, HUD, which had acquired title to the complex at a marshal's sale,
sought to evict the tenants. 555 F.2d at 169. For a general comparison of Caramico and Alexan-
der, see id. at 169-70.
61. 555 F.2d at 169, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). For the text of this provision, see
note 14 supra.
62. 555 F.2d at 169-70, citing 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). The court noted that the terms
"program" and "project" are not defined in the URA and that the legislative history does not
illuminate Congress' intent with respect to these terms. 555 F.2d at 169.
63. 555 F.2d at 170. The court further explained that "persons displaced by such programs
are persons displaced by governmental activities involving the acquisition of land to accomplish
an objective benefiting the public or fulfilling a public need." Id.
64. Id. This qualification was in response to the plaintiffs' contention that since HUD had
the options of rehabilitating, demolishing, or selling the complex, its actions in evicting the
tenants constituted a federal program or project. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 168-70.
67. See notes 28-48 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 50-66 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 38-48 & 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
1978-1979]
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result of an acquisition" phrase of section 4601(6) in Harris v. Lynn. 7" Al-
though Harris did not involve foreclosures on federal mortgage insurance,
the case demonstrates the mode of interpretation likely to be employed by
the Eighth Circuit in that context. 71  Harris involved a claim for URA
benefits by former tenants of a project owned by the St. Louis Housing
Authority (Authority). 72 The construction of the project was financed during
the 1950's through development loans made by the federal government. 73 In
1973, deplorable conditions at the housing complex prompted the Authority
to terminate the project. 74  HUD concurred in the Authority's decision, 75
and after the tenants were relocated, the vacant buildings were demolished
with modernization finds provided by HUD. 76  The Eighth Circuit upheld
the district court's denial of the URA assistance to the litigants. 77  The dis-
trict court had held that the plaintiffs were "not 'displaced persons' within
the meaning of any of the factual situations set forth in section 4601(6) and
4637." 78
70. 411 F. Snpp. 692, 694 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977). In af-
firming the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, the
Eighth Circuit expressly adopted the legal reasoning employed by the district court in denying
URA benefits to the claimants. Harris v. Lynn, 555 F.2d 1357, 1359 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd 411
F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
71. The Eighth Circuit specifically considered federal mortgage insurance and URA eligibil-
ity in Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). Afoorer
involved the dislocation of persons by a private company which had acquired the property for
rehabilitation with the aid of federal financial assistance in the form of mortgage insurance and
interest rent subsidy payments. 561 F.2d at 177-78. Holding that the plaintiffs were not "dis-
placed persons" entitled to benefits tinder the URA, the court concluded that the "plain statu-
tory language indicates that URA benefits are available to displaced persons only on projects
undertaken by federal agencies or by state agencies receiving federal financial assistance." Id. at
178-79. The court found support for its position in several of the operational sections of the
URA. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622(a), 4627, 4628, 4630 (1976). It took particular notice of the
fact that mortgage insurance is expressly excluded from the definition of "Federal financial assis-
tance." 561 F.2d at 178-79, citing 42 U.S.C. § 4601(4) (1976). For the text of § 4601(4), see note
18 supra. The court also drew extensively upon the legislative history of the URA in its analysis.
561 F.2d at 179-82. The court asserted that the "URA was intended to benefit those displaced
by public agencies with coercive acquisition power, such as eminent domain," and proposed a
test for determining whether URA benefits attach: "Was the real property acquired by a gov-
ernmental entity with the power of eminent domain?" Id. at 182-83.
72. 411 F. Supp. at 693. The tenants based their status as "displaced persons" on two
alleged "acquisitions": 1) the 1951 "acquisition" of the property by the Authority through the
use of federal development loans; and 2) the 1955 "acquisition" of the property by the federal
government by virtue of a "declaration of trust" whereby the Authority purportedly acknowl-
edged that it held the property for the benefit of the Public Housing Administration, the pre-
decessor of HUD, and holders of bonds issued pursuant to a contract between the Authority
and the United States, pending satisfaction of all indebtedness on the bonds. Id. at 694.
73. Id. at 693. The tenants claimed that these loans constituted federal financial assistance
within the meaning of § 4601(6), thus qualifying them for the status of "displaced persons"
under the URA. Id.
74. Id. The project was characterized as a "human disaster area." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 555 F.2d at 1359. The Eighth Circuit adopted the legal reasoning of the district court as
the disposition of the tenants' claims for URA benefits. Id. See note 70 supra.
78. 411 F. Supp. at 694. Section 4637 provides, inter alia, that a person who "moves from
his dwelling . . . as a direct result of any project or program which receives federal financial
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Observing that "Congress advisedly limited the eligible class (in Section
4601(6)) to those forced to move as a result of an 'acquisition,"' 79 the East-
ern District of Missouri construed the phrase "as a result of the acquisition
of such.real property . . . for a program or project undertaken by a Federal
agency, or with Federal financial assistance" to mean that section 4601(6)
eligibility required the federal acquisition of property for a program or pro-
ject to directly cause the dislocation of the individuals claiming URA assis-
tance.8 0 Examining the Authority's alleged 1951 "acquisition" of the prop-
erty8 1 and the government's alleged 1955 "acquisition" of the property 82
the Harris court determined that neither of these transactions resulted in
the relocation of the tenants in 1973.83 Grounding its analysis on the URA
as a whole 8 4 and on the Act's legislative history, 85 the Harris court charac-
terized "acquisition" as the key term for the purposes of section 4601(6)
eligibility.8 6  Consistent with its determination that the tenants were not
dislocated by an "acquisition" within the meaning of the URA, the Harris
court denied their claim for URA benefits. 87
Common to the Second, Seventh and Eighth Circuits8 8 is an in pari
materia construction 89 of the entitlement provision of the URA. Each circuit
has construed section 4601(6) within the context of the statute as a whole. 90
assistance under title I of the Housing Act of 1949, . . . or as a result of carrying out a com-
prehensive city demonstration program under title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropoli-
tan Development Act of 1966 shall . . . be deemed to have been displaced as the result of the
acquisition of real property." 42 U.S.C. § 4637 (1976). The court held that the statutory lan-
guage of this particular provision did not apply to the facts in the instant case. 411 F. Supp. at
695-98.
79. 411 F. Supp. at 695.
80. Id. at 694, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976).
81. 411 F. Supp. at 694. The district court noted that the plaintiffs could not have been
displaced "'as a result' of the 1951 acquisition by the Authority" because the plaintiffs were not
residing at the property at that time. Id. See note 72 supra.
82. 411 F. Supp. at 694-95. The Harris court stated that under applicable Missouri law, the
instrument entitled "declaration of trust" did not operate to transfer equitable or legal title to
the property to the federal government and therefore did not constitute an "acquisition" by the
federal government for the purposes of the URA. Id. See note 72 supra. The court asserted that
even if the government had "acquired" the property within the meaning of § 4601(6) by opera-
tion of the "trust" instrument, the plaintiffs were not displaced as a result of the government's
alleged 1955 acquisition of ownership. 411 F. Snpp. at 695 (emphasis added).
83. 411 F. Supp. at 694-95.
84. Id. at 695, citing 42 U.S.C. § 4637 (1976). For the pertinent text of § 4637, see note 78
supra. The court noted that there are "a number of references in the Act to 'acquisition' and
Iacquiring agency."' 411 F. Supp. at 695. Moreover, the court construed uncodified § 219 of the
Act as evidencing congressional intent to limit the class of people eligible for URA benefits. Id.
85. 411 F. Supp. at 695.
86. Id. The court equated the terms "acquisition" and "acquiring agency." Id.
87. Id. at 697-98.
88. See notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
89. For cases establishing the foundation for in pari materia construction of statutes, see,
e.g., White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938); Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928);
Kohlsaat v. Murphy, 96 U.S. 153 (1878).
90. See notes 45, 62-63 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
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The Caramico and Harris courts buttressed their interpretation of section
4601(6) by referring to the legislative history of the URA. 91 In Caramico
and Alexander, the Second and Seventh Circuits determined that the terms
"project or program" contemplate benefit to the public as a whole, 92 and
maintained that a failure of a project could not be characterized as a "pro-
ject" within the meaning of section 4601(6). 9 3  The Caramico court, stress-
ing the voluntary and deliberate aspects of a program or project, 94 added
that inherent in these terms is the concept of construction.9 5
In its interpretation of section 4601(6), the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri concentrated on the term "acquisition"
within the context of the entire phrase "as a result of the acquisition of such
property . . . for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or
with Federal financial assistance." 96  Moreover, the Harris court examined
the cause of the dislocation of the individuals claiming URA assistance, 97 and
found no causal relationship between the 1951 and 1955 transactions and the
subsequent termination of the project in 1973.98 In its analysis, the district
court employed an in pari materia approach in construing section 4601(6). 99
B. The Common Meaning Approach of the District of Columbia Circuit
In Cole v. Harris,100 the D.C. Circuit analyzed the nexus between fed-
erally insured mortgages and URA eligibility from a different perspective.
Cole entailed the saga of Sky Towers, 10 1 an apartment complex which was
purchased by a nonprofit corporation that had secured a federally insured
mortgage on the property.' 0 2 The defaults of two general contractors during
the planned rehabilitation of the complex forced the mortgagee to fore-
close. 10 3 The mortgagee then conveyed the title to Sky Towers to HUD in
91. See notes 44 & 85 and accompanying text supra. The Alexander court concluded that
the legislative history of the URA failed to illuminate the meaning of the terms "project or
program" for the purposes of §4601(6). See note 62 supra.
92. See notes 41-43 & 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 41-42, 47-48 & 64-65 and accompanying text supra. The Alexander court
noted that "an order by HUD to vacate a public housing project because that project had
become an irretrievable failure cannot be considered .. .a program or project" under the URA.
555 F.2d at 170. The Caramico court observed that the "default acquisition may be said to
represent a failure of the FHA program rather than its desired result." 509 F.2d at 699.
94. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
96. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
97. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 81-83 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
100. 571 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part Cole v. Lynn, 389 F. Supp. 99 (D.D.C. 1975).
101. 571 F.2d at 592. Sky Towers was built during the 1950's. Id.
102. Id. The insurance was obtaining pursuant to § 236 of the National Housing Act. Id.,
citing 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976). The purchase of Sky Towers occured in 1970. 571 F.2d at
592. For a general discussion of federal mortgage insurance, see note 22 supra.
103. 571 F.2d at 592. The trial record indicated that at the time of the defaults by the
general contractors, the mortgagee was willing to allow the nonprofit sponsor to complete the
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order to satisfy the statutory requirements for qualification for the mortgage
insurance benefits. 10 4  Fifteen months later, 10 5 HUD, determined that
further rehabilitation of the complex was futile and decided to demolish Sky
Towers and sell the vacant land. 10 6 Toward this end, HUD distributed
written notices to vacate to the tenants. 10 7 Several of the buildings were
subsequently demolished. 10 8 Former tenants brought suit alleging, inter
alia, that HUD had failed to comply with the requirements of the URA. 10 9
The district court issued a preliminary injunction against further demolition
and evictions" 0 and, several months later, granted partial summary judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, holding that the tenants who had vacated Sky Towers
were entitled to benefits under the URA.111 In affirming this aspect of the
trial court's decision," 2 the D.C. Circuit declared that the tenants qualified
as displaced persons under the "plain terms" of the written notice clause of
the URA. 1" 3
Relying on what it considered to be the common meaning of the words
of section 4601(6), the court, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Bazelon,
concluded that HUD had "acquired" Sky Towers with the foreclosure of the
mortgage 114 and that the demolition constituted a "program or project.""15
The court asserted that "It]his common sense interpretation is reinforced by
consideration of the policies of the [URA]." ' 6
In support of its conclusion that the former tenants qualified as dis-
placed persons under the notice clause, the court remarked that section
4601(6) does not require that a federal project be contemplated at the time
rehabilitation work. 389 F. Supp. at 101. HUD, however, "insisted that the property be fore-
closed." Id. The lower court suggested that HUD's action was grounded upon compliance with
a federal housing regulation. Id., citing 24 C.F.R. § 236.56 (1977). Indeed, the dissent in Cole
v. Harris relied heavily on this regulation in its analysis. See note 122 and accompanying text
infra.
104. 571 F.2d at 592. Title was transferred pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713(g), 1713(k) (1976).
See note 22 supra.
105. 571 F.2d at 592. HUD took title on June 15, 1973; its decision to terminate the project




109. 389 F. Supp. at 100. The tenants claimed eligibility under the written notice clause of §
4601(6). Id. For a summary of the requirements of the written notice clause, see text accom-
panying note 16 supra.
110. 389 F. Supp. at 99-100.
111. 571 F.2d at 594.
112. Id. at 595.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The purpose of the demolition was to eliminate urban blight. Id. The court added
that this fact distinguished the instant case from Alexander. Id. at 596 n.27, quoting Alexander
v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978). See notes 63
& 64 and accompanying text supra.
116. 571 F.2d at 595. The court stressed that the purpose of the URA is "to ensure that
displaced persons do not 'suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for
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of acquisition. 1 1 7 Rejecting both the statutory construction 118 and the
legislative history 119 offered by the Government to rebut this conclusion,
the court asserted that the "notice clause is clear on its face." 120
Claiming that the majority opinion ignored important precedent, 12 1 the
vigorous dissent in Cole declared that: 1) both the acquisition clause 122 and
the written notice clause 123 contemplate a voluntary acquisition; and 2) both
an actual acquisition and a notice of a proposed acquisition must be for a
program or project. 124  The dissent characterized both HUD's insistence
that the property be foreclosed1 25 and its subsequent receipt of title 126 as
"involuntary,"' 1 27 and determined that the mortgage foreclosure acquisition
of Sky Towers was not within the "programs or projects" contemplated by
the URA. 128 Following a careful examination of the legislative history of the
URA, 129 the dissent concluded that the notice clause was intended to cover
only those who receive written notice prior to an acquisition and relocation,
regardless of whether or not the proposed acquisition does in fact occur. 130
117. 571 F.2d at 596. It should be noted that under the written notice clause of § 4601(6),
the real property need not be acquired. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). See H.R. No. 1656, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5850, 5853 ("If a person
moves as a result of such [written] notice, it makes no difference whether or not the real
property is acquired.").
118. Id. The Government cited Caramico for the proposition that § 4601(6) requires HUD, at
the time of the acquisition, to have a particular project or program in mind. Id. The Govern-
ment contended that this restriction also applies to the "acquiring agency" of the written notice
clause. Id. The court refuted this argument by noting that Caramico involved the acquisition
clause and by distinguishing the terms "acquisition" and "acquiring agency" as used in the
alternative provisions of § 4601(6). Id. The court then suggested that under the written notice
clause, only "the order to vacate . . . must be for a federal program or project." Id. at 596-97
(emphasis supplied by the court).
119. Id. at 597-98 & n.32.
120. Id. at 597.
121. Id. at 599-600 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978); Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692 (E. D. Mo. 1976),
aff'd, 555 F.2d 1357 (1977); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974).
122. For a summary of the acquisition clause, see text accompanying note 15 supra.
123. For a summary of the written notice clause, see text accompanying note 16 supra.
124. 571 F.2d at 601 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 601-02 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent speculated that HUD could not issue
the mortgage insurance increase required by the mortgagee for allowing the sponsor to com-
plete the rehabilitation because 24 C.F.R. § 236.56 (1977) would be violated. 571 F.2d at
601-02 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Section 236.56 prohibits HUD from issuing mortgage insurance
for projects where the rents will exceed the rents for similar housing. 24 C.F.R. § 236.56
(1977). The dissent concluded that HUD was obligated to insist that the mortgagee foreclose
and, therefore, the action was involuntary. 571 F.2d at 601-02 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See note
104 and accompanying text supra.
126. 571 F.2d at 601-03 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
127. 571 F.2d at 603 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 601-03 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on the Second and Seventh
Circuits' definition of "projects" as excluding involuntary acquisitions. Id. See notes 38-48 &
62-66 and accompanying text supra.
129. 571 F.2d at 608 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing H.R. REP. No. 1656, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5850, 5853.
130. 571 F.2d at 608 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent based its limited construction of
the written notice clause upon a comparison of the original Senate URA bill and the House
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In support of its determination that for both the acquisition clause and the
written notice clause, the actual acquisition or notice of proposed acquisition
must be for a "program or project,""' the dissent relied upon the other
provisions of the URA 1 32 and upon case law. 133  The dissent cited
Caramico, Alexander and Harris as supporting the proposition that there can
be no "acquisition for a program or project" if "HUD's accession to title is
involuntary." 134
Cole's departure from the other circuits' interpretation of section 4601(6)
is a function of the method of statutory construction employed by the D.C.
Circuit, which applied a common meaning construction to the terms of this
provision. 1 35  The Cole court determined that since the terms of section
version which was subsequently enacted. 571 F.2d at 607-09 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing S.1,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(6), 116 CONG. REC. 40163 (1970); S.1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §
105(1)-(5), 115 CONG. REC. 31372 (1969). Judge Wilkey noted that in the original Senate ver-
sion, the definition of "displaced person" included those forced to move "as a result of the
acquisition or reasonable expectation of acquisition of ... real property in whole or in part, by
a Federal or State agency." 571 F.2d at 607 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), quoting S.1, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 105(1)-(5), 115 CONG. REC. 31372 (1969) (emphasis supplied by the court). Compar-
ing the original Senate version with the enacted version, the dissent emphasized that § 4601(6)
as enacted limited URA eligibility. 571 F.2d at 609 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent relied
on the only sentence in the House Report that explained the meaning of the written notice
clause: "If a person moves as a result of such a notice to vacate, it makes no difference whether
or not the real property actually is acquired." Id. at 608 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5850, 5853. The dissent remarked that consideration of this statement within the context of the
legislative evolution of the written notice clause rendered it "clear and unmistakable in mean-
ing." 571 F.2d at 608 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey concluded that the enacted version
of § 4601(6) does not cover "all persons displaced with notice from property already owned and
acquired by the agency." Id. at 609 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the court).
Rather, the dissent suggested that § 4637 is the relevant statutory provision in such a situation.
Id. at 611 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing 42 U.S.C. § 4637 (1976). For the text of § 4637, see
note 78 supra.
131. 571 F.2d at 609 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey noted that this conclusion was
the basis of his dissent from the views of the majority. Id.
132. 571 F.2d at 609 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622(a), 4625(a) (1970). The
dissent noted that the operational sections of the URA begin with the phrase: "Whenever the
acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency in any
State will result in the displacement of any person on or after January 2, 1971, the head of such
agency shall make a payment to any displaced person. ... 571 F.2d at 609 (Wilkey, J., dis-
senting), quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622(a), 4625(a) (1976) (emphasis supplied by the court). The
dissent reinforced its argument by referring to § 4651(5), 42 U.S.C. § 4651(5) (1976), which
"directs all agencies to schedule construction projects in such a way that no person occupying
real property is required to move 'without at least ninety days' written notice ...of the date by
which such move is required." 571 F.2d at 609-10 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), quoting 42 U.S.C. §
4651(5) (1976) (emphasis supplied by the court).
133. 571 F.2d at 610 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Mo. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977). The dissent relied on Harris as support for the
proposition that the URA "does not apply to persons displaced from property already in the
ownership of the concerned agency, even though a notice to vacate for a project may be given."
571 F.2d at 610 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the court). For discussion of
Harris, see notes 70-87 and accompanying text supra.
134. 571 F.2d at 609 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), citing Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. granted 436 U.S. - (1978); Caramico v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974);
Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977).
135. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
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4601(6) are clear on their face, a probe into legislative history is unwar-
ranted.' 36 One consequence of this mode of construction is that assistance
under the URA is awarded in cases in which relief would be denied under
the in pari materia approach. 137
IV. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 4601(6):
AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON.
Although the cases present varying factual situations, 138 an issue central
to each is the statutory construction of section 4601(6) with respect to "ac-
quisitions" resulting from foreclosure on property subject to federal
mortgage insurance. 139  Under the general rules of statutory construction,
legislative intent is a controlling factor, 1 40 but resort to legislative history
should be limited to instances where the statutory language is unclear. 141
Consequently, a threshold question in cases concerning entitlement to URA
benefits with respect to properties subject to federal mortgage insurance is
whether the language of section 4601(6) is ambiguous.
The D.C. Circuit in Cole has determined that the words of this section
are clear, 142 whereas other circuits, in an effort to ascertain the intended
meaning of the undefined terms of section 4601(6), have resorted to an in-
quiry into the policies underlying the Act, 143 to an examination of the
URA, 14 and, finally, to a review of legislative history.' 45  Consistent with
the concept that sections of an act in pari materia should be construed to-
gether, 146 these circuits have indicated that section 4601(6) should be inter-
preted to prevent conflicts with other provisions of the URA. 1 47
It is submitted that these circuits, in construing the undefined terms of
section 4601(6) consistently with the URA as a whole, have correctly inter-
preted these words. Otherwise, apparent inconsistencies between sections
4601(6) and other URA provisions emerge. For example, it is suggested that
without an implied restriction that the "acquisition" of section 4601(6) be
voluntary, the policies of section 4651 concerning negotiations to acquire real
136. 571 F.2d at 597. The Cole court indicated that an examination of legislative history
would be appropriate only if it were clear and convincing. Id., citing, United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973). The majority
concluded that the legislative history of the notice clause is, "at best, inconclusive." 571 F.2d at
597. See id. at n.32.
137. See note 27 supra.
138. See notes 28-36, 50-59, 70-76 & 100-08 and accompanying text supra.
139. But see notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
140. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 607 (1940).
141. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977); United States v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295; 315 (1953).
142. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 45, 62 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 44 & 85 and accompanying text supra.
146. See White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938); Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S.
233, 237 (1928).
147. See notes 44, 62 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
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property 148 would not be applicable to many federally insured mortgage
foreclosures.
Moreover, it is submitted that the term "acquisition" necessarily con-
templates voluntariness: it should possess an active rather than a passive
nature for purposes of the URA. A federally insured mortgage foreclosure
procedure should therefore not constitute an "acquisition" within the mean-
ing of section 4601(6). The importance of Caramico with respect to this issue
lies not in its conclusion that a "program or project" necessarily involves the
concept of construction, 1 49 but rather in its emphasis on the factors of delib-
erateness and voluntariness associated with a decision to "construct." "Pro-
gram or project," it is submitted, should be defined for URA purposes as a
program or project designed to benefit the public as a whole. 5 0
In Cole, the D.C. Circuit appeared to accept the Caramico court's con-
cept of voluntary acquisition, but distinguished that case because it involved
the acquisition clause and not the written notice clause of section 4601(6). 15 1
Asserting that the terms "acquisition" as used in the acquisition clause and
"acquiring agency" as used in the written notice clause are not the same,' 52
the Cole majority remarked that, for purposes of the written notice clause,
the focus should be on the phrase "as a result of a written order" and a
literal interpretation should be followed. 1 53 The Supreme Court, however,
has admonished the courts to "place the words of a statute in their proper
context by resort to the legislative history" since such history "illuminates
the meaning of acts, as context does that of words." 154 It is suggested that
the legislative history of the URA indicates that the words "acquiring
agency" used in the written notice clause refer to the agency contemplating
an acquisition' 5 5 and that an emphasis is placed on the deliberate aspects of
an "acquisition." It is therefore submitted that under both the acquisition
and written notice clauses, a voluntary action, such as an acquisition or deci-
sion to acquire, by a federal agency or state agency receiving federal finan-
cial assistance is required.
This conclusion is reinforced by the in pari materia approach to con-
struing the undefined terms of section 4601(6). Under this method, no con-
ditional determination of ambiguity is required because the in pari materia
rule of construction is mandated. 156  It is submitted that the Cole court
failed to consider the written notice clause in unison with the other provi-
148. 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1976). These policies require "[t]hat the head of a Federal agency
• ..make every reasonable effort to acquire ... real property by negotiations." Id. § 4651(1).
Moreover, the Act provides that the property be appraised before the initiation of negotiations
relating to its acquisitions. id. § 4651(2).
149. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976).
151. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
152. 571 F.2d at 596.
153. Id.
154. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 154, 157 (1972).
155. See H.R. REP. No. 1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5850, 5854. See also Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87
(1934).
156. See generally cases cited note 146 supra.
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sions of the URA, and that its "common meaning" construction of section
4601(6) is therefore misleading. The Cole majority rejected the argument
that section 4637157 of the Act would be surplusage if the written notice
clause were given its plain meaning. 158  Assuming the Cole court was cor-
rect in its determination that the two provisions may be read consistently, it
is nonetheless submitted that a simultaneous consideration of section 4637,
the remaining sections of the URA, and the written notice clause of section
4601(6) would lead to the conclusion that the terms of the written notice
clause are indeed ambiguous. 159 Resort to legislative history, it is submit-
ted, would therefore be not only legitimate but also necessary for a correct
construction of the written notice clause of the URA, particularly within the
context of a federally insured mortgage foreclosure procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
A foreclosure on a federally insured mortgage, it is submitted, does not
constitute an "acquisition" within the terms of the URA, nor does the gov-
ernmental agency become an "acquiring agency" after receipt of the title to
property due to this foreclosure process. Adopting the rationale of Caramico,
it is submitted that foreclosures on federally insured mortgages are involun-
tary responses to the mortgagor's default, and consequently do not satisfy
the voluntary "acquisition" required under an in pari materia construction of
section 4601(6). The relocation of persons as a result of the mortgage foreclo-
sure process, or even after this process has been completed, should not fall
within the coverage of the Act, because no "acquisition," as that word is
used within the URA, has occurred.
Catherine Kalita McLamb
157. 42 U.S.C. § 4637 (1976). Section 4637 provides that persons who are required to relo-
cate as a result of certain federal aid programs involving urban renewal shall, "for the purposes
of [the URA], be deemed to have been displaced as the result of the acquisition of real prop-
erty." Id. See note 78 supra.
158. 571 F.2d at 597 n.32. The dissent suggested that if the written notice clause were to be
given its "common sense" meaning, the written notice clause would encompass all persons to
which § 4637 is addressed and thereby obviate the need for that provision. Id. at 612 (Wilkey,
J., dissenting), citing 42 U.S.C. § 4637 (1976). The dissent asserted that the fact that Congress
specially provided coverage for certain persons in § 4637 indicated that Congress could not have
intended that the written notice clause be construed according to its "common sense" meaning.
571 F.2d at 612 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Characterizing this assertion by the dissent as "mis-
guided," the Cole majority remarked that the basis for the dissent's reliance on § 4637 was not
apparent as "written notice is not required by either program referred to in [§ 4637]." 571 F.2d
at 597 n.32, citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1455(c)(1), 3307 (1976). For the text of 9 4637, see note 78
supra.
159. For the reasoning of the Cole dissent on this issue, see note 130 and accompanying text
supra. It is submitted that if the operational sections of the URA were also to be given a "plain
meaning" construction, assistance would not always be available for displaced persons under the
written notice clause as the required "acquisition" may not occur. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622-4630
(1976). This interpretation would also be contrary to legislative intent. See H.R. REP. No. 1656,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5850, 5854. Indeed,
the Cole majority indicated the ambiguity of the written notice clause with reference to § 4637:
"Congress could quite reasonably conclude that even tinder the notice definition it was uncer-
tain that persons displaced by these [federal aid] programs would be eligible for [URA] ben-
efits." 571 F.2d at 597 n.32.
[VOL. 24: p. 91
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss1/5
